-
Underline the three problems the Supreme Court
of the United States identifies with UC's medical school
admissions preferences.
-
Circle the two standards the Court says preferences must meet to be constitutional.
-
Draw a star next to each of the four purposes the regents of UC—Davis say
their preference system serves. Put a plus "+" sign next to each of those
purposes that you think is justifiable and a minus "-" sign next to each of the
purposes that you do not think is justifiable.
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Summarize the Court's decision in one sentence.
(Writing for a divided Court, Justice Powell rendered a judgment. Four justices
agreed with part of it and another four justices agreed with another part of his
opinion. The lack of consensus among the justices has kept the Bakke case from
having the impact on American law that it might have had otherwise. The issue is
still a controversial one.)
Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court.
. . . The special admissions program is undeniably a classification based on race
and ethnic background.
....
The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all persons. Its
language is explicit: "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." . . . The guarantee of equal protection cannot
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied
to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it
is not equal.
....
Petitioner urges us to adopt . . . more restrictive view of the Equal Protection
Clause and hold that discrimination against members of the white "majority"
cannot be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as "benign."
....
. . . [T]here are serious problems of justice connected with the idea of preference.
. . . First, it may not always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign.
Courts may be asked to validate burdens imposed upon individual members of a
particular group in order to advance the group's general interest. . . . Nothing in
the Constitution supports the notion that individuals may be asked to suffer
otherwise impermissible burdens in order to enhance the societal standing of
their ethnic groups. Second, preferential programs may only reinforce common
stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without
special protection based on a factor having no relationship to individual worth. . .
. Third, there is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons in respondent's
position to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making.
....
We have held that in "order to justify the use of a suspect classification [i.e. in
order to discriminate on the basis of race], a State must show that its purpose . . .
is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the
classification is 'necessary . . . to the accomplishment' of its purpose. . . . The
special admissions program purports to serve the purposes of: (i) "reducing the
historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the
medical profession," . . . (ii) countering the effects of societal discrimination; (iii)
increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities currently
underserved; and (iv) obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an
ethnically diverse student body. It is necessary to decide which, if any, of these
purposes is substantial enough to support the use of a suspect classification.
If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its student body some specified
percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such
a preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid.
Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic
origin is discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids.
....
Petitioner identifies, as another purpose of its program, improving the delivery of
health-care services to communities currently underserved. It may be assumed
that in some situations a State's interest in facilitating the health care of its
citizens is sufficiently compelling to support the use of a suspect classification.
But there is virtually no evidence in the record indicating that petitioner's special
admissions program is either needed or geared to promote that goal.
....
The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a diverse student body.
This clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher
education. . . . The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to
education includes the selection of its student body. . . .
....
It may be assumed that the reservation of a specified number of seats in each
class for individuals from the preferred ethnic groups would contribute to the
attainment of considerable ethnic diversity in the student body. But petitioner's
argument that this is the only effective means of serving the interest of diversity is
seriously flawed. . . . The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest
encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element. Petitioner's
special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder
rather than further attainment of genuine diversity.
....
. . . [R]ace or ethnic background may be deemed a "plus" in a particular
applicant's file, yet it does not insulate the individual from comparison with all
other candidates for the available seats. The file of a particular black applicant
may be examined for his potential contribution to diversity without the factor of
race being decisive when compared, for example, with that of an applicant
identified as an Italian-American if the latter is thought to exhibit qualities more
likely to promote beneficial educational pluralism. Such qualities could include
exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership
potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming
disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor, or other qualifications
deemed important.
....
In summary, it is evident that the Davis special admissions program involves the
use of an explicit racial classification never before countenanced by this Court. It
tells applicants who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano that they are totally
excluded from a specific percentage of the seats in an entering class. No matter
how strong their qualifications, quantitative and extracurricular, including their
own potential for contribution to educational diversity, they are never afforded the
chance to compete with applicants from the preferred groups for the special
admissions seats. At the same time, the preferred applicants have the
opportunity to compete for every seat in the class.
....
With respect to respondent's entitlement to an injunction directing his admission
to the Medical School, petitioner has conceded that it could not carry its burden
of proving that, but for the existence of its unlawful special admissions program,
respondent still would not have been admitted. Hence, respondent is entitled to
the injunction, and that portion of the judgment must be affirmed.
In lieu of Questions to Consider, complete the activity titled "Key Excerpts from
the Opinion."
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