-
Underline the three problems the Supreme Court
of the United States identifies with UC's medical school
admissions preferences.
-
Circle the two standards the Court says preferences
must meet to be constitutional.
-
Draw a star next to each of the four purposes
the regents of UC—Davis say their preference system
serves. Put a plus "+" sign next to each of
those purposes that you think is justifiable and a minus
"-" sign next to each of the purposes that
you do not think is justifiable.
-
Summarize the Court's decision in one sentence.
(Writing
for a divided Court, Justice Powell rendered a judgment.
Four justices agreed with part of it and another four
justices agreed with another part of his opinion. The
lack of consensus among the justices has kept the Bakke
case from having the impact on American law that it
might have had otherwise. The issue is still a controversial
one.)
Justice
Powell delivered the opinion of the Court.
.
. . The special admissions program is undeniably a classification
based on race and ethnic background.
....
The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all
persons. Its language is explicit: "No State shall
. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." . . . The guarantee of equal
protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual
and something else when applied to a person of another
color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then
it is not equal.
....
Petitioner urges us to adopt . . . more restrictive view
of the Equal Protection Clause and hold that discrimination
against members of the white "majority" cannot
be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as "benign."
....
. . . [T]here are serious problems of justice connected
with the idea of preference. . . . First, it may not always
be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign.
Courts may be asked to validate burdens imposed upon individual
members of a particular group in order to advance the
group's general interest. . . . Nothing in the Constitution
supports the notion that individuals may be asked to suffer
otherwise impermissible burdens in order to enhance the
societal standing of their ethnic groups. Second, preferential
programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding
that certain groups are unable to achieve success without
special protection based on a factor having no relationship
to individual worth. . . . Third, there is a measure of
inequity in forcing innocent persons in respondent's position
to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their
making.
....
We have held that in "order to justify the use of
a suspect classification [i.e. in order to discriminate
on the basis of race], a State must show that its purpose
. . . is both constitutionally permissible and substantial,
and that its use of the classification is 'necessary .
. . to the accomplishment' of its purpose. . . . The special
admissions program purports to serve the purposes of:
(i) "reducing the historic deficit of traditionally
disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical
profession," . . . (ii) countering the effects of
societal discrimination; (iii) increasing the number of
physicians who will practice in communities currently
underserved; and (iv) obtaining the educational benefits
that flow from an ethnically diverse student body. It
is necessary to decide which, if any, of these purposes
is substantial enough to support the use of a suspect
classification.
If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its student
body some specified percentage of a particular group
merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a
preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial
but as facially invalid. Preferring members of any one
group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin
is discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution
forbids.
....
Petitioner identifies, as another purpose of its program,
improving the delivery of health-care services to communities
currently underserved. It may be assumed that in some
situations a State's interest in facilitating the health
care of its citizens is sufficiently compelling to support
the use of a suspect classification. But there is virtually
no evidence in the record indicating that petitioner's
special admissions program is either needed or geared
to promote that goal.
....
The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment
of a diverse student body. This clearly is a constitutionally
permissible goal for an institution of higher education.
. . . The freedom of a university to make its own judgments
as to education includes the selection of its student
body. . . .
....
It may be assumed that the reservation of a specified
number of seats in each class for individuals from the
preferred ethnic groups would contribute to the attainment
of considerable ethnic diversity in the student body.
But petitioner's argument that this is the only effective
means of serving the interest of diversity is seriously
flawed. . . . The diversity that furthers a compelling
state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications
and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is
but a single though important element. Petitioner's special
admissions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity,
would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine
diversity.
....
. . . [R]ace or ethnic background may be deemed a "plus"
in a particular applicant's file, yet it does not insulate
the individual from comparison with all other candidates
for the available seats. The file of a particular black
applicant may be examined for his potential contribution
to diversity without the factor of race being decisive
when compared, for example, with that of an applicant
identified as an Italian-American if the latter is thought
to exhibit qualities more likely to promote beneficial
educational pluralism. Such qualities could include exceptional
personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership
potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history
of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with
the poor, or other qualifications deemed important.
....
In summary, it is evident that the Davis special admissions
program involves the use of an explicit racial classification
never before countenanced by this Court. It tells applicants
who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano that they are totally
excluded from a specific percentage of the seats in an
entering class. No matter how strong their qualifications,
quantitative and extracurricular, including their own
potential for contribution to educational diversity, they
are never afforded the chance to compete with applicants
from the preferred groups for the special admissions seats.
At the same time, the preferred applicants have the opportunity
to compete for every seat in the class.
....
With respect to respondent's entitlement to an injunction
directing his admission to the Medical School, petitioner
has conceded that it could not carry its burden of proving
that, but for the existence of its unlawful special admissions
program, respondent still would not have been admitted.
Hence, respondent is entitled to the injunction, and that
portion of the judgment must be affirmed.
In lieu of Questions to Consider, complete the activity
titled "Key Excerpts from the
Opinion."
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