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Key Excerpts
from the Majority Opinion
The
decision was not unanimous.
Speaking for a seven-person majority, Justice Henry Brown
delivered the opinion of the court.
This
case turns upon the constitutionality of an act of the general
assembly of the state of Louisiana, passed in 1890, providing
for separate railway carriages for the white and colored
races. . . .
The
constitutionality of this act is attacked upon the ground
that it conflicts both with the thirteenth amendment of
the Constitution, abolishing slavery, and the fourteenth
amendment, which prohibits certain restrictive legislation
on the part of the states.
1. That
it does not conflict with the thirteenth amendment, which
abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, is too clear for argument. . . .
Indeed,
we do not understand that the thirteenth amendment is strenuously
relied upon by the plaintiff. . . .
2. .
. .The object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly
to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before
the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been
intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to
enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality,
or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory
to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation
in places where they are liable to be brought into contact
do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race
to the other, and have been generally, if not universally,
recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures
in the exercise of their police power. . . .
So far,
then, as a conflict with the fourteenth amendment is concerned,
the case reduces itself to the question whether the statute
of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation, and with respect
to this there must necessarily be a large discretion on
the part of the legislature. In determining the question
of reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with reference
to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the
people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort,
and the preservation of the public peace and good order.
Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a law which
authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races
in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more obnoxious
to the fourteenth amendment than the Acts of Congress requiring
separate schools for colored children in the District of
Columbia, the constitutionality of which does not seem to
have been questioned, or the corresponding acts of state
legislatures.
We consider
the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist
in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority.
If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in
the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to
put that construction upon it. . . . The argument also assumes
that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and
that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except
by an enforced commingling of the two races. We cannot accept
this proposition. If the two races are to meet upon terms
of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities,
a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a voluntary
consent of individuals. . . . Legislation is powerless to
eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based
upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can
only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present
situation. If the civil and political rights of both races
be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or
politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially,
the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon
the same plane.
Questions
to Consider:
- What
do the justices state is the object of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
- The
Plessy decision distinguishes between political
and social equality. Discuss this distinction. Can one
exist without the other?
- What
racial and cultural assumptions are inherent in the statement
that "legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts
or abolish distinctions based upon physical differences?"
- The
decision states that legislation cannot overcome social
prejudice. Can it reinforce social prejudice? How?
- How
do you respond to the court's contention that if any inferiority
is evident, it is only because colored people "choose"
to interpret the act in that manner. Do you believe colored
people had a choice whether or not to feel or not to feel
inferior in light of such legislation?
- According
to Justice Brown's opinion, social equality must be the
result of what three factors?
- After
the court dismissed the Thirteenth Amendment violation
argument, it reduced the question before the court to
whether or not Louisiana's legislation is reasonable.
What is the "reasonable" standard and how did the court
apply it in this case?
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