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Excerpts
from the Dissenting Opinion
Justice
John Marshall Harlan wrote the dissent.
While
there may be in Louisiana persons of different races who
are not citizens of the United States, the words in the
act 'white and colored races' necessarily include all citizens
of the United States of both races residing in that state.
So that we have before us a state enactment that compels,
under penalties, the separation of the two races in railroad
passenger coaches, and makes it a crime for a citizen of
either race to enter a coach that has been assigned to citizens
of the other race. Thus, the state regulates the use of
a public highway by citizens of the United States solely
upon the basis of race.
However
apparent the injustice of such legislation may be, we have
only to consider whether it is consistent with the constitution
of the United States.
The
thirteenth amendment does not permit the withholding or
the deprivation of any right necessarily inhering in freedom.
It not only struck down the institution of slavery as previously
existing in the United States, but it prevents the imposition
of any burdens or disabilities that constitute badges of
slavery or servitude. . . . But, that amendment having been
found inadequate to the protection of the rights of those
who had been in slavery, it was followed by the fourteenth
amendment . . . declaring that 'all persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside,' and that 'no state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.' These two amendments [Thirteenth
and Fourteenth], if enforced according to their true intent
and meaning, will protect all the civil rights that pertain
to freedom and citizenship.
The
white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in
education, in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it
will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to
its great heritage, and holds fast to the principles of
constitutional liberty. But in view of the constitution,
in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here.
Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all
citizens are equal before the law.
. .
. The present decision, it may well be apprehended, will
not only stimulate aggressions, more or less brutal and
irritating, upon the admitted rights of colored citizens,
but will encourage the belief that it is possible, by means
of state enactments, to defeat the beneficient purposes
which the people of the United States had in view when they
adopted the recent amendments of the constitution, by one
of which the blacks of this country were made citizens of
the United States and of the states in which they respectively
reside, and whose privileges and immunities, as citizens,
the states are forbidden to abridge. Sixty millions of whites
are in no danger from the presence here of eight millions
of blacks. The destinies of the two races, in this country,
are indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both
require that the common government of all shall not permit
the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction
of law. What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more
certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between
these races, than state enactments which, in fact, proceed
on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and
degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches
occupied by white citizens? That, as all will admit, is
the real meaning of such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana.
Questions to Consider:
- According
to Justice Harlan, what is the basic question before the
court?
- In
arguing that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
in fact do apply to the Louisiana act, Justice Harlan
particularly refers to the amendments' "true intent and
meaning." What do you think he believed were the amendments'
true intent and meaning?
- In
your opinion, does Justice Harlan's constitutional interpretation
of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments effectively
challenge the majority's interpretation of the same amendments
in this case?
-
According to Justice Harlan, what effects will this type
of legislation have on the United States and its citizens?
- What
does Justice Harlan believe is the real meaning behind
the legislation enacted in Louisiana? Do you agree? Why
or why not?
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