The decision was 7 to 2. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney delivered the opinion of the Court.
. . . Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country,
and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed
and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and
as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and
immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citizen? One of which
rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the
cases specified in the Constitution.
We think they [people of African ancestry] are not [citizens], and
that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under
the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of
the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and
secures to citizens of the United States.
. . . [T]he legislation and histories of the times, and the language
used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the class of
persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether
they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the
people, nor intended to be included in the general words used in that
For if they were so received, and entitled to the privileges and
immunities of citizens, it would exempt them from the operation of the
special laws and from the police regulations which they considered to be
necessary for their own safety. It would give to persons of the negro
race, who were recognized as citizens in any one State of the Union, the
right to enter every other State whenever they pleased...to go where
they pleased at every hour of the day or night without molestation,
unless they committed some violation of law for which a white man would
be punished; and it would give them the full liberty of speech in public
and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might
speak; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and
carry arms wherever they went. And all of this would be done in the face
of the subject race of the same color, both free and slaves, and
inevitably producing discontent and insubordination among them, and
endangering the peace and safety of the State.
The act of Congress, upon which the plaintiff relies, declares that
slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime,
shall be forever prohibited in all that part of the territory ceded by
France, under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of thirty-six
degrees thirty minutes north latitude, and not included within the
limits of Missouri. And the difficulty which meets us at the threshold
of this part of the inquiry is, whether Congress was authorized to pass
this law under any of the powers granted to it by the Constitution; for
if the authority is not given by that instrument, it is the duty of this
court to declare it void and inoperative, and incapable of conferring
freedom upon any one who is held as a slave under the laws of any one of
There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal
Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United
States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure;
nor to enlarge its territorial limits in any way, except by the
admission of new States. That power is plainly given; and if a new State
is admitted, it needs no further legislation by Congress, because the
Constitution itself defines the relative rights and powers, and duties
of the State, and the citizens of the State, and the Federal Government.
But no power is given to acquire a Territory to be held and governed
permanently in that character.
. . . [I]t may be safely assumed that citizens of the United
States who migrate to a Territory belonging to the people of the United
States, cannot be ruled as mere colonists, dependent upon the will of
the General Government, and to be governed by any laws it may think
proper to impose. The principle upon which our Governments rests is the
union of States, sovereign and independent within their own limits in . .
. their internal and domestic concerns, and bound together as one
people by a General Government, possessing certain enumerated and
restricted powers, delegated to it by the people of the several States. .
But the power of Congress over the person or property of a citizen
can never be a mere discretionary power under our Constitution and form
of Government. The powers of the Government and the rights and
privileges of the citizen are regulated and plainly defined by the
Constitution itself. And when the Territory becomes a part of the United
States, the Federal Government enters into possession in the character
impressed upon it by those who created it. It enters upon it with its
powers over the citizen strictly defined, and limited by the
Constitution, from which it derives its own existence, and by virtue of
which alone it continues to exist and act as a Government and
sovereignty. It has no power of any kind beyond it; and it cannot, when
it enters a Territory of the United States, put off its character, and
assume discretionary or despotic powers which the Constitution has
denied to it.
. . . [T]he rights of private property have been guarded with . . .
care. Thus the rights of property are united with the rights of person,
and placed on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the
Constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, and property, without due process of law. And an act of
Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or
property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a
particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no
offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due
process of law.
Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the court that the
act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning
property of this kind in the territory of the United States north of the
line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the Constitution, and is
therefore void; and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his
family, were made free by being carried into this territory; even if
they had been carried there by the owner, with the intention of becoming
a permanent resident.
But there is another point in the case which depends on State power
and State law. And it is contended, on the part of the plaintiff, that
he is made free by being taken to Rock Island, in the State of Illinois,
independently of his residence in the territory of the United States;
and being so made free, he was not again reduced to a state of slavery
by being brought back to Missouri.
. . . [I]n the case of Strader et al. v. Graham . . .
the slaves had been taken from Kentucky to Ohio, with the consent of the
owner, and afterwards brought back to Kentucky. And this court held
that their status or condition, as free or slave, depended upon the laws
of Kentucky, when they were brought back into that State, and not of
Ohio. . . .
So in this case. As Scott was a slave when taken into the State of
Illinois by his owner, and was there held as such, and brought back in
that character, his status, as free or slave, depended on the laws of
Missouri, and not of Illinois.
Upon the whole, therefore, it is the judgment of this court, that it
appears by the record before us that the plaintiff in error is not a
citizen of Missouri, in the sense in which that word is used in the
Constitution; and that the Circuit Court of the United States, for that
reason, had no jurisdiction in the case, and could give no judgment in
it. Its judgment for the defendant must, consequently, be reversed, and a
mandate issued, directing the suit to be dismissed for want of
Read the judgment in the Supreme Court case Dred Scott v. John F. A. Sandford, March 6, 1857 from the National Archives.
Questions to Consider
- Why does Chief Justice Taney believe that Dred Scott is not a
citizen of the United States? Why is this issue important for the case?
- What is Chief Justice Taney's reasoning for declaring that the
Missouri Compromise is unconstitutional? Why is this issue important for
- Does Chief Justice Taney agree with the doctrine "once free, always free?" Explain.
- Since Chief Justice Taney first determined that Dred Scott did
not have standing to sue in federal court (and therefore that the
federal court system had no jurisdiction in this case), do you think
Chief Justice Taney had authority to comment on the constitutionality of
the Missouri Compromise? Why or why not?
- Why do you suppose Chief Justice Taney extended his opinion to address the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise?